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RECENT DECISIONS

tion, it follows that unrealized appreciation may
22 constitute a proper
source from which dividends may be declared.
P.C.

TORTS-NEGLIGENCE OF POLICE OFFICER-MUNICIPAL IMMUBY STATUTE-CONSTRUCTION.-Plaintiff's intestate,

NITY LIMITED

while lawfully on a public street in New York City, was killed as a
result of injuries received when a commandeered automobile, negligently operated by a municipal police officer in the pursuit of suspicious characters who were fleeing from the officer, ran into the decedent and his pushcart. This action was brought against the City of
New York and other defendants to recover damages for the death.
Trial Term dismissed the plaintiff's complaint against the City of
New York. On appeal, held, the judgment at Trial Term unanimously affirmed. Berger v. City of New York, 260 App. Div. 402,
22 N. Y. S. (2d) 1006 (2d Dept. 1940).
No recovery can be had on common law principles against a
municipal corporation for the torts of policemen or other municipal
appointees whose duties are undertaken in the fulfillment by the
municipal corporation of its governmental as distinguished from its
corporate functions.1 The plaintiff-appellant contended that he has a
remedy under Section 50-a of the General Municipal Law, 2 which is
22 Plaintiff further contended that it was improper not to "write down" to
actual value on the company's books the cost of investments in and advances to
subsidiaries and thereby fail to take unrealized depreciation into account. Thus,
plaintiff took the inconsistent position by arguing that investments and advances
must be taken at their actual value, whereas fixed assets are to be considered
only at cost. In short, the directors should have taken unrealized depreciation
into account, while unrealized appreciation should have been disregarded. The
patent inconsistency of this position was resolved by the court by stating: "that
the same reasons which show that unrealized appreciation must be considered
are equally cogent in showing that unrealized depreciation must be considered.
In other words, the test being whether or not the value of the assets exceeds
the debts and the liability to stockholders, all assets must be taken at their
actual value." However, although plaintiff's position was correct as to these
investments and advances and also with respect to certain demolished properties
which should have been written off and not considered in computing the amount
of surplus, even if all these deductions claimed by the plaintiff were allowed in
full, the actual value of the land and improvements at all times during the period
in question exceeded the book value thereof by an amount sufficient to show a
surplus greater than the amount of the dividends.
I Maximilian v. Mayor, etc., of City of New York, 62 N. Y. 160 (1875);
Woodhull v. Mayor, etc., of City of New York, 150 N. Y. 450, 44 N. E. 1038
(1896); Lefrois v. County of Monroe, 162 N. Y. 563, 57 N. E. 185 (1900);
Wilcox v. City of Rochester, 190 N. Y. 137, 82 N. E. 1119 (1907) ; Lacock v.
City of Schenectady, 224 App. Div. 512, 231 N. Y. Supp. 379 (3d Dept. 1928) ;
Duren v. City of Binghamton, 172 Misc. 580, 15 N. Y. S. (2d) 518 (1939),
aff'd, 258 App. Div. 694, 18 N. Y. S. (2d) 518 (3d Dept. 1940).
2 Formerly N. Y. HIGHWAY LAW §282-g.
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one of three sections 3 in which the legislature attempted to eliminate
the immunity based upon "governmental function" by granting a remedy against "sovereign irresponsibility" in certain cases of accidents
arising out of the operation of municipal vehicles. An important test
of whether a remedial statute is in derogation of the common law has
been to ask whether or not it creates a liability where none previously
existed.4 The sections on which the plaintiff relies are remedial in
that they give a remedy where none previously existed, but, because
they actually do afford hitherto unknown relief, they are in derogation
of the common law and must be strictly construed. 5 Thus does the
phrase "municipally owned" conclude the plaintiff.
If the basis of the municipal immunity is, as the courts have said,6
the fact that there has been a delegation of his duties to the officer by
the state directly or the fact that the municipality is merely the means
the state employs to maintain forces of officers, this question arises:
does the plaintiff have a remedy against the state in the Court of
Claims under what was, at the time of the accident, Section 12-a 7 of
the Court of Claims Act? That section expressly constituted a waiver
of the state's "immunity from liability for the torts of its officers and
employees." 8
The question of the liability of the state in the Court of Claims
for the tort of a municipal police officer has apparently never been
presented. If the test for liability of the state is, as the case of Sears
v. State 9 seems to indicate, that the cost of the undertaking in which
the tort was committed be met out of the state treasury, then the state
is not liable, for the state does not defray the cost of municipal police
departments. If, however, the case of Paigev. State 10 represents the
3

N. Y. GEN. MuNicn,. LAW §§ 50-a-50-c.

(1916) §§ 146, 153;
1 McKINNEY, CONSOLIDATED LAWS OF NEW YORE 39.
5Leppard v. O'Brien, 225 App. Div. 162, 164, 232 N. Y. Supp. 454, 456
(3d Dept. 1929), aff'd, 252 N. Y. 563, 170 N. E. 144 (1929) ; Miller v. Town of
Irondequoit, 243 App. Div. 240, 241, 276 N. Y. Supp. 497, 499 (4th Dept. 1935).
6 Maximilian v. Mayor, etc., of City of New York, 62 N. Y. 160 (1875) ;
Woodhull v. Mayor, etc., of City of New York, 150 N. Y. 450, 44 N. E. 1038
(1896) ; Lacock v. City of Schenectady, 224 App. Div. 512, 231 N. Y. Supp. 379
(3d 7Dept. 1928).
N. Y. CT. CL. AcT §§ 8, 9(2).
8 Former N. Y. CT. CL. AcT § 12-a; Jackson v. State, 261 N. Y. 134, 184
N. E. 735 (1933); American Engineering Co. v. State, 153 Misc. 528, 273 N. Y.
Supp. 853 (1934); Green v. State, 160 Misc. 398, 290 N. Y. Supp. 36 (1936).
9 152 Misc. 32, 272 N. Y. Supp. 694 (1934), rev'd, 245 App. Div. 901,
282 N. Y. Supp. 492 (3d Dept. 1935), aff'd, 270 N. Y. 579, 1 N. E. (2d) 339
(1936).
10269 N. Y. 352, 199 N. E. 617 (1936). The Court of Appeals held the
state liable in the Court of Claims for a tort upon the person of an inmate of a
private charitable reformatory, to which the inmate had been committed by a
police court, upon the theory that the negligence of those in charge of the institution was a tort of officers and employees of the state acting as such. The
court said, "To exalt that circumstance [that the public moneys expended did not
come out of the state treasury] to a ground of distinction in itself would be
4 CUiRTIS, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
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view which the Court of Appeals will take when the problem (involving torts of police officers) is ultimately presented, the result will be
that the state will be held liable. The latter eventuality would seem to
be the prospect in view of the prevailing trend away from the municipal immunity."' At any rate, plaintiffs in such cases as this are not
altogether without hope of remedy. The Board of Estimate of the
City of New York may, in its discretion, make
an award for personal
12
injuries or death caused by a police officer.
L. D. V.

TRAFFIC INFRACTION-PRIMA FACIE CASE OF UNLAWFUL PARK-

ING.-On fifteen different occasions an automobile, of which the deferdant was the registered owner, was found by police officers to have
been parked continuously for more than one hour in a congested, business or residential street of New York City. Each of these occurrences constituted a violation of a regulation adopted and promulgated
by the police commissioner. The district attorney prosecuted these
traffic infractions in the Magistrates' Court. The defendant, in perunnecessarily to blunt the beneficient [sic] purpose of the waiver by the State
of its immunity."
"Duren v. City of Binghamton, 172 Misc. 580, 15 N. Y. S. (2d) 518
(1939), aff'd, 258 App. Div. 694, 18 N. Y. S. (2d) 518 (3d Dept. 1940).
22 N.Y. CITY ADMIN. CODE § 93d-3.0. The history of this section is most
interesting. New York City Local Law No. 13 of 1927 empowered the Board
of Estimate and Apportionment in its discretion to "make an award to a person
who has been or hereafter shall be ifijured by a police officer while such officer
is engaged in arresting any person, or in retaking any person who has escaped
from legal custody or in executing any legal process." Until after the death
had occurred in the case at bar, this law remained unchanged. It was held
constitutional in Matter of Evanis v. Berry, 262 N. Y. 61, 186 N. E. 203 (1933),
in which the court said: "The fact that the statute applies to persons receiving
injuries prior to its enactment is no objection to its validity." In 1934, by
New York City Local Law No. 16, § 246-a of the Greater New York Charter
prevailing at that time was adopted, and it extended the power of the Board of
Estimate and Apportionment to include cases of death caused by police officers
under the same circumstances as those set forth in. Local Law No. 13 of 1927.
Up to that time personal injuries exclusive of death had been covered by the
statute. The 1934 amendment further extended the power of the Board to make
awards in cases of death or injury caused by police officers while engaged in
endeavoring to make arrests. However, it required a unanimous vote of the
Board of Estimate as a condition to any award and in place of the words "in
its discretion," it used the words "as a matter of grace and not as a matter of
right." Except for a minor amendment to § 246-a of that Charter by New York
City Local Law No. 7 of 1936, which is not material to the present discussion,
the enactment remained unchanged until after the adoption of the latest Charter
in 1936. The new Charter contains no provision dealing with this matter. But
the Administrative Code of 1937 (Laws of 1937, c. 929), § 93d-3.0, as amended
by New York City Local Law No. 30 of 1939, provides that the Board of
Estimate, by a unanimous vote when the public interest will best be served, may
make an award against the city or any agency (of the city) upon any claim
certified by the comptroller to be equitable, but illegal or invalid.

